INTRODUCTION

DOES ACTIVE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT ADD VALUE?
This question has been the source of continued debate in financial economics since the contributions of Sharpe (1966 ), Treynor (1966 and Jensen (1968) . One strand of literature finds that investment managers have little stock-selection ability consistent with the efficient market framework of Fama (1970) . Research from the United States by Malkiel (1995) and Gruber (1996) and the United Kingdom by Leger (1997) finds that the investment management industry, on average, destroys value for investors through under-performing benchmark returns. For instance, Gruber (1996) reports that the average mutual fund under-performs index returns by some 65 basis points per annum for the period 1985 through 1994. These studies advocate a passive approach to the stock-selection problem.
By contrast, another strand of literature finds some limited evidence of stock-selection ability by managers. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) , Wermers (2000) and Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White (2001) find that investment managers select stocks that outperform benchmark returns, reflecting the incomplete arbitrage model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . Moskowitz (2000) explains that this second set of studies examines the individual equity holdings of funds, creating a hypothetical portfolio for each fund that contains only stocks and does not account for transaction costs or expenses. Wermers (2000) reports that while the gross returns from equity holdings outperform a broad market index by 130 basis points per year, the net fund returns under-perform the same index by 100 basis points per year 1 .
While both schools take differing approaches to the evaluation problem, considerable consensus is found that, as an industry, investment managers under-perform stated benchmarks on an afterfee basis (i.e., post transaction costs and management expenses). The value (or otherwise) of active management has immediate implications for Australia's system of retirement funding, termed superannuation 2 . This is potentially important as the international experience suggests that active investing resulted in a high-cost production function for investment management that yields, in aggregate, poor results. Investors that select an active fund require the manager to execute stock trades at prices sufficiently different from fully-informed prices to, first, compensate them for the cost of becoming informed and, second, to earn superior risk-adjusted returns.
Recent research considering this issue by Drew and Noland (2000) , Drew and Stanford (2000 , 2001a , 2003 , Sawicki (2000) and Sawicki and Ong (2000) for the Australian setting provides corroborating evidence of the experience in the United States. Using techniques comparable to Gruber (1996) , Drew and Stanford (2000) find that the average domestic equity superannuation fund under-performs benchmark returns by a range of 46 to 93 basis points per annum for the period 1991 through 1999 3 . Drew and Stanford (2000) find that as an industry, investment managers destroy value for superannuation members, with the costs of research and trading associated with active management being largely sunk.
2 A common type of managed fund in Australia is the superannuation fund. Superannuation funds are designed to set aside an amount during the working lives of people so as to meet their financial needs during retirement. 3 Moreover, Drew and Stanford (2001b) find that active funds are regularly terminated due to poor performance, with survivorship bias negatively affecting industry performance by 23 basis points per annum on a risk-adjusted basis.
This study departs with the tradition of a broad industry based evaluation of the investment management industry and considers whether the portfolio returns achieved by individual investment managers persist through time. Are there investment managers that have a 'hot hand' providing consistently high returns for investors? Can investors fashion a fund selection strategy that would, ex-ante, permit them to garner superior returns? Specifically, this study tests the hypothesis that the relative return achieved by a fund last year has no predictive value for tomorrow.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The ability to predict the future performance of funds based on ex-ante information has been the topic of intense debate by investors, practitioners and researchers alike. The received statement of market efficiency, the efficient market hypothesis, implies that historical performance is no guide to future performance and that any excess performance achieved by an investment manager is the result of chance, not the skillful application of active stock selection techniques.
However, empirical testing of this position has provided mixed results over the 1990s.
The persistence case, forwarded by Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) , Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) , Brown and Goetzmann (1995) , Kahn and Rudd (1995) , Bal and Leger (1996) , Blake (1996b), Gruber (1996) 4 , Stewart (1998), and Carpenter and Lynch (1999) report that past returns and relative rankings are useful in predicting returns and rankings in the short run (1 to 3 years). Grinblatt and Titman (1992) provide longer-term evidence of persistence (10 years), indicating that there is positive persistence in mutual fund performance.
In a novel approach, Miller (1994, 1995) rank the performance of funds over complete stock market cycles, reporting that the correlations of portfolio performance rankings from one market cycle to the next are generally positive and meaningful. Gruber (1996) concludes that these results are of "economic importance (pp.795)" with investors buying the top ranked funds from previous periods earning superior raw and risk-adjusted returns in the future.
If the persistence anomaly holds, superannuation investors could achieve their retirement objectives far more rapidly through the selection of active managers, on an ex-ante basis, that would consistently deliver superior returns.
The case rejecting the differential skill of managers consistently through time is led by Troutman (1991), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) , Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , Bogle (1995) , Malkiel (1995) , Carhart (1997), Cheng, Pi and Wort (1999) . These researchers consider both raw and risk-adjusted returns from individual funds and investment management firms, answering the question of whether persistence is economically significant in the negative.
The contribution of Carhart (1997) shows the failure of the capital asset pricing model to capture the cross-section of fund returns (particularly relating to short-term momentum effects in stock returns) is responsible for the persistence puzzle. Carhart (1997) observes that performance persistence is simply a matter of luck, stating that "(these funds) accidentally end up holding last year's winners. Since the returns on these stocks are above average in the ensuing year, if these funds simply hold their winning stocks, they will enjoy higher one-year expected returns and incur no additional transaction costs for this portfolio. With so many mutual funds, it does not seem unlikely that some funds will be holding many of last year's winning stocks simply by chance (pp. 73)." This study adjusts for risk using the Sharpe (1966 Sharpe ( , 1994 index, in an attempt to mitigate the problem of benchmark inefficiency. Arteaga, Ciccotello and Grant (1998) Using a sample of hedge funds in the United States, Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) report no evidence of performance predictability on a raw return and risk-adjusted basis. Troutman (1991) describes the reliance investors place on past performance data when selecting funds as a "cognitive error, as many (trustees) see strong past performance and prestigious client lists as representative of future investment management ability (pp. 37)." The implication of findings largely supportive of the efficient market hypothesis by this second group of researchers is neatly summarised by Lakonishok et al (1992) . Lakonishok et al (1992) deduce that no evidence of return persistence over time permits researchers to "make the stronger statement that not only do (pension) funds on average fail to add value, but the same is true for just about all of them (pp. 356)."
The performance persistence debate has immediate implications for Australia's superannuation fund industry, particularly for the choice of fund decision. Shefrin (2000) suggests that "there does seem to be something of a hot-hands effect. But most investors misread what this performance says about the future … (investors) tend to attribute too much of that success to skill rather than luck (pp. 174)." The continued controversy surrounding the predictability (or otherwise) of fund returns provides the motivation for this study to explore whether the hot-hand anomaly can be exploited in an economically significant manner for superannuation investors.
In investigating this question, we consider the fund selection problem from the perspective of a retail investor 6 . Specifically, this study considers:
1. The randomness of Australian equity superannuation fund performance, using past performance (raw and risk-adjusted returns) as the criterion for fund selection; 2. A real-world simulation of the actual results achieved by this system of fund selection over the 1990s; and 3. Implications for the fund selection decision to be made by retail superannuation investors 7 .
RESEARCH DESIGN
The data used in this study consists of monthly returns for a sample of 148 retail "Australian This study is concerned with whether a cognitive bias toward past performance data by superannuation investors is detrimental to total portfolio returns. Specifically, we ask whether, on an ex-ante basis, investors are able to differentiate between luck and investment manager skill in an economically meaningful way. Given our focus on the problem from a retail perspective, the selection of performance metrics must reflect techniques that are accessible and commonly employed by individual-investors (and their financial advisers) to guide fund choice. Following our research motivation, two annual performance metrics are considered: first, raw or riskunadjusted returns; and, second, a Sharpe index proxy of risk-adjusted returns, estimated as the fund's annual excess return over the Reserve Bank of Australia 13-week treasury note divided by the fund's annual standard deviation of returns 9 . Across the two metrics, several experiments were conducted to test for persistence in Australian equity superannuation fund returns.
Specifically, the testing procedure was divided into three steps:
1. Following Bogle (1995) , we calculated the past returns of all funds, selected the top five, ten and twenty in each calendar year period, and then recorded the future yearly return actually achieved 10 .
2. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) , Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) , Kahn and Rudd (1995) and Brown et al (1999) test persistence by using a year-by-year cross-sectional regression of past returns on current returns. Such a technique is also used in this study with a significant t-statistic for the slope coefficient leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis that past performance is unrelated to future performance 11 . A significant positive (negative) slope coefficient is evidence of performance persistence (reversal); and, 3. Finally, a non-parametric two-way contingency matrix experiment employed by Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) , Kahn and Rudd (1995) , Malkiel (1995) , Bal and Leger (1996) and Brown et al (1999) is adopted as a confirmatory measure. First, we sort the funds into winners and losers in period t-1 and winners and losers in period t. We distinguished winners from losers by ranking fund performance to the median performance, defining the above-median performers as winners and below-median performing funds as losers. If the statistical evidence shows that winners in period t-1 9 The Sharpe (1966 Sharpe ( , 1994 ratio measures the expected return per unit of risk for a zero-investment strategy. Support for selection of the Sharpe index as a proxy for risk-adjusted returns is provided by Bal and Leger (1996) based on Roll's (1977) critique. Unlike the Sharpe index, Bal and Leger (1996) explain that there is an implicit benchmark portfolio in using the Treynor (1966) and Jensen (1968) techniques. Treynor and Jensen measures can only be estimated with respect to a market index, making it difficult to interpret the measure within a CAPM equilibrium framework due to inefficient benchmarks. For a discussion of the limitations of single-index measures and multi-index alternatives for Australian equity superannuation funds see Drew and Stanford (2000) . 10 Due to a sample size of over 800 funds, Bogle (1995) considers the top twenty funds only.
persist as winners in period t, we argue that this is evidence of performance persistence 12 .
The contingency tables illustrate the frequency of four possible outcomes: winner-winner (WW); loser-winner (LW); winner-loser (WL); and, loser-loser (LL).
ANALYSIS
A. Raw returns
We commenced our analysis of performance persistence in raw returns through an examination of how the best performing funds in one year perform the following year using Bogle's (1995) framework. To minimise the possibility of randomness in any single year, we made comparisons of fund rankings in each year throughout the 1990s (i.e., how the top five, ten and twenty fund performers of 1991 ranked in 1992, through to how the best performing funds in 1998 performed in 1999). The evidence provided in Table 1 suggests that a top performing fund in one year has borne no systematic relationship to its ranking in the subsequent year. An equally weighted portfolio of the top five ranked funds in the first year provides a raw return of +33.58 per cent, over double the average return for all funds of +14.94 per cent. In the second year, the average return falls to +11.83 per cent, below the average fund return of +13.90 per cent. Funds that rank in the top five in a given year, on average, ranked 71 (of 119 funds) in the subsequent year. We follow Lo (1991) and Bogle (1995) in describing this as evidence of mean reversion. When examining the question of performance persistence over a full decade, it appears from the preliminary analysis that a strategy of investing in the best performing funds of the past year provides no ex-ante information regarding the selection of winners in the subsequent year.
Our second test of persistence is a year-by-year cross-sectional regression of past returns on current returns. Positive estimates of the coefficient b with significant t-statistics are evidence of persistence. In this case, period t-1 performance contains useful information for predicting period t performance. Figure 1 shows eight scatter plots (1991-92 through 1998-99) with OLS lines showing the regression slopes for each of these tests 13 . These results are summarised in Table 2 . The results reported in Table 2 show that winners follow winners in an economically meaningful way in 1996-97 and 1997-98. However, this pattern reverses in 1991-92, 1992-93, 1994-95 and 1998-99 . In these periods winners lose, with a significant reversal pattern evident. Over the Year-by-year performance persistence for funds, raw returns 13 Brown et al (1999) note that the upper right quadrant in each panel gives the WW category and the lower left quadrant corresponds to the LL category (referred to in Table 4 of this study). 
Period t-1 (1998) Period t (1999)
entire period, a non-significant relationship was found, with the estimated slope coefficient being negative, indicating a bias toward an annual reversal of returns. Given the inconsistency of the persistence results, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no systematic persistence on a raw return basis.
Table 3
Two-way contingency matrix, raw returns Finally, we used contingency tables in a non-parametric test of performance predictability. Table 3 confirms that there is little evidence of persistence in fund performance over the 1990s.
The null hypothesis of no winning predictability is not rejected in any of the years covered on a raw returns basis, with no statistically significant results recorded. For the individual years, 5 years out of 9 indicated negative persistence, that is, losing following a winning year. In addition, a separate analysis was conducted indicating little evidence of persistent under-performance (popularly termed the "cold-hand" phenomenon, or LL) over the sample period 14 .
The non-parametric evidence suggests that, over the 1990s, winners tended to repeat 48 per cent of the time, a result largely harmonious with the toss of a fair coin.
B. Risk-adjusted returns
Tucker, Becker, Isimbabi and Ogden (1994) forward that the most egregious error committed during any assessment of fund performance is conducting a comparison of fund returns without consideration of differential risk. Further, Tucker et al (1994) observe that while researchers have been aware of the need to account for differential risk for more than 30 years, individual investors often persist in ignoring this critical issue. Motivated by the critique of Tucker et al (1994) , we test for predictability in the risk-adjusted returns of Australian equity superannuation funds using Sharpe indices as a proxy. The reward-to-variability or Sharpe ratio is a popular tool used by: financial advisers recommending funds to retail investors; asset consultancy firms providing advice to trustees; and, is the basis of star-rating systems for funds developed by firms such as Morningstar 15 .
As with raw returns, Table 4 illustrates that those funds that top league tables on a risk-adjusted basis in any given year generally fail to outperform industry and market returns in the following period. The only period when a strategy of investing in the best performing funds (top five, ten 14 We repeat the experiment to test for a cold hand in fund manager returns or persistence in the LL category. A fund that was denoted a loser in the first year, tended to repeat the performance on 44 per cent of occasions over the sample period. Unlike the hot hand results, one significant result was recorded for 1994-95 with a z-test result of -3.5. This indicates significant reversal, that is, winning following losing and vice-versa. This is not evidence of a cold hand, but rather mean reversion. 15 Morningstar rates the investment performance of funds using a rating system of one to five stars. For a complete discussion of the anatomy of the rating system see Blume (1998) and Sharpe (1998) . For an analysis of the impact of mutual fund age on Morningstar ratings see Morey (2001) . and twenty) garnered superior risk-adjusted returns was the 1993 selection-period and 1994
investment-period, with limited evidence of positive persistence also recorded in the second half of the decade. Across the entire sample period, an investor skilled (or lucky) enough to select the top five ranked funds each year achieved an average Sharpe index of 10.618 versus the all fund average of 1.695. Next year, the average Sharpe for the best five performing funds falls to 1.587, which is below the average fund result of 2.101 and the Sharpe ratio for the market portfolio at 2.113. The fall from best performing in year t-1 to year t for risk-adjusted returns is dramatic.
Evidence of mean reversion is prevalent with those funds that rank in the top five in a given year on a risk-adjusted basis, on average, ranked 84 (of 119 funds) in the subsequent year. The coefficient, t-statistic and R 2 data provided in Table 5 are the result of regressing fund returns in one year against returns in the next year where returns are reported for funds in both years 16 . The risk-adjusted evidence provides no support to the hypothesis of investment managers having differential skill. In total, statistically significant results were recorded in four of the eight observation periods, however, an equal proportion of statistically significant positive and negative results were recorded, suggesting both positive persistence and reversal effects.
Over the sample period, the relationship was not significant, with the estimated coefficient suggesting, on average, a slight reversal trend 17 . Interestingly, across both raw and risk-adjusted returns, the use of past returns as an explanatory variable in a year-by-year cross-sectional 17 This test does not account for the possibility of cross-correlation among funds. For any given period it is likely that funds managed according to the same "style" will perform similarly, at least to some extent (Malkiel 1995) . To test for such potential cross-correlation impacts on our conclusions, we attempted to repeat the experiments for fund categories. However, Morningstar's classification system does not classify funds within "Australian Equity Superannuation Funds -General" into categories such as growth, income, value, etc. Currently, the only distinguishing features of the funds relate to their names (e.g., ethical, imputation, small companies fund). However, the majority of fund names are simply "Fund Manager X Australian Share Superannuation Fund." We are currently developing a characteristics based classification system to differentiate manager styles. State-of-theart research by Davis (2001) directly addresses the issue of whether any particular investment styles reliably deliver abnormal performance and considers whether any evidence of performance persistence can be found when funds of similar styles are compared. For the period 1965 through 1998, Davis (2001) finds that none of the styles employed by US equity mutual fund managers exhibit positive abnormal returns. Davis (2001) reports some evidence of short-run performance persistence among the best-performing growth funds (hot hand) and among the worst performing small-cap funds (cold hand), however, both these results were not sustained beyond one year. Davis (2001) concludes that the impact of cross-correlation among funds is limited, stating that the "economic benefit(s) to active management … are not obvious (pp. 25)." regression fails to capture the cross-section of future returns in an economically meaningful manner 18 .
Again we employed a non-parametric test of performance predictability, on this occasion using risk-adjusted results, as a confirmatory measure. Table 6 shows there are minimal differences across the sample period in terms of the percentage of persistent winners and what would be expected by chance. As with the regression results reported in Table 5 , significant positive persistence was recorded around 1997-98. However, a reversal pattern of significance was also evident from the 1995 (winner) to 1996 (loser). For the individual periods, 7 years out of 9 indicated negative persistence, that is, losing following a winning year. In addition, the data indicated no evidence of the cold-hand anomaly, with no significant results of loser-loser repetition in any of the observation periods. Over the 1990s, winners tended to repeat 46 per cent of the time, a result corroborating the raw return findings.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUND SELECTION
For retail investors faced with the problem of selecting a fund to manage the domestic equity portion of their asset allocation, there is little likelihood of earning abnormal returns by selecting the best performing fund managers from the previous period. The evidence presented in this study supports Bogle's (1992) claim that "investment management is a field fraught with fragility and fallibility, where today's careful, rational fund selections are too often tomorrow's embarrassments (pp. 94)." Bogle (1992) notes that while it is virtually impossible to pick the winning funds from year to year, it is easy to pick a single winner -a passive all-market index fund. The evidence presented in Tables 1 and 4 highlights the superiority of the market portfolio against a cohort of active funds on a raw and risk-adjusted return basis. Malkiel (1995) supports this claim, suggesting "most investors would be considerably better off by purchasing a low expense index fund, than by trying to select an active fund manager who appears to possess a hot hand (pp. 571)." Recent research by Malkiel and Radisich (2001) finds that index funds have regularly produced rates of return exceeding those of active equity funds by 100 to 200 basis points per annum in the United States over the 1990s, finding that there are two reasons for the excess performance by passive funds: "management fees and trading costs (pp. 10)."
The issue of fund expenses requires further analysis. The funds investigated in this study had an average annual management expense ratio of 3.7 per cent per annum 19 . As discussed in the research design section of the paper, this study considered fund returns net of management fees but excluding entry and exit loads to test for return persistence. Therefore, when conducting the various experiments to test the hot hand anomaly, the costs levied by the investment manager on entering and exiting their fund was assumed away. The average entry fee for the funds investigated was 1.8 per cent, with an exit load of 2.0 per cent. These institutional costs are considerable, and add further weight to the study's non-rejection of the null hypothesis of no differential skill among managers.
statistics were 1.98 and 2.01 respectively. Given no evidence of serial correlation, we do not pursue further into the first-order autoregressive AR1 and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. 19 Typically, the management fee is accrued daily and is payable quarterly in arrears (or upon the full withdrawal of the fund) by the redemption of units.
The active management techniques employed by the investment managers considered in this study appear to add little value in the transformation of retirement savings into retirement income. Active investing is high cost, incurs substantial entry and exit loads and generates higher taxation burdens for investors than a passive alternative. The marginal benefits (MB) of active management are far exceeded by its marginal costs (MC). Those funds that can achieve a resultant MB > MC from active stock selection in any given year seem destined to reverse this trend the following year. The findings echo Kendall's (1953) well-known epithet that "the series looks like a wandering one, almost as if once a week the demon of chance drew a random number from a symmetrical population of fixed dispersion and added it to the current price to determine the next period's price (pp.23)."
Market efficiency survives the challenge from the performance persistence literature. Using a number of reasonable strategies, the results of this study provide little comfort for those retail investors (and their financial advisers) relying heavily on a fund's track record to guide selection. A rational, self-seeking agent would achieve their retirement income objectives far more rapidly through implementing a passive approach to both fund and asset selection. As we proceed toward member-choice in superannuation, the mean-reverting behaviour of investment manager returns raises a number of questions regarding the optimal design of a superannuation fund -a topic we consider in our next paper.
